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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
         Albert Lawrence appeals the grant of summary judgment 
to National Westminster Bank in his suit alleging age and 
handicap discrimination and denial of severance benefits.  We 
will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district 
court. 
                                I. 
         Albert Lawrence was hired by Citizens First National 
Bank of New Jersey, now National Westminster Bank, New Jersey, 
in October 1979 as Vice President/Chief Investment Officer of the 
Trust Department.  In 1985 he was promoted to the position of 
Senior Vice President/Chief Investment Officer.   
         On June 30, 1987, Lawrence was injured in a car 
accident and sustained severe back injuries.  As a result he 
wears a back brace.  Lawrence alleges he suffers from chronic 
pain and discomfort because of the injury.  Nevertheless, after 
the accident, Lawrence returned to work and resumed his position 
with the bank. 
         In early 1992, Allan Nichols became bank Chairman.  
Nichols developed new goals and business objectives for the bank, 
and specifically for the Trust Department.  Although the parties' 
accounts of what ensued over the next one and one half years 
differ, the bank contends Lawrence's level of performance 
substantially deteriorated.  On September 3, 1993, at the age of 
sixty, Lawrence was terminated for sub-standard performance and 
"behavior not befitting a manager."            
         Lawrence disputes he was fired for "cause."  He 
contends this explanation was pretextual, and that he was fired 
because of his age and/or his physical condition.  Lawrence filed 
suit in the United States District Court for New Jersey alleging 
age and handicap discrimination under New Jersey and federal 
laws.   
         As we have noted, the district court granted National 
Westminster Bank's motion for summary judgment.  Lawrence v. 
National Westminster Bank, New Jersey, No. 94-1368, 1995 WL 
506043 (D. N.J. Aug. 16, 1995).  Lawrence now appeals. 
                              II. 
         We have jurisdiction over the final order of the 
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  "When we review a grant 
of summary judgment, we apply the same test as the district court 
should have applied initially."  Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 
F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 115 S.Ct. 
2611, 132 L.Ed.2d 854 (1995).  A court may grant summary judgment 
when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c).  "When the nonmoving party bears the burden of 
persuasion at trial, the moving party may meet its burden on 
summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party's evidence 
is insufficient to carry its burden of persuasion at trial."  SeeBrewer v. 
Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329 (3d 
Cir. 1995); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322- 
23 (1986).  A nonmoving party creates a genuine issue of material 
fact when it provides evidence "such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party."  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  "In reviewing the record, 
the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences."  Brewer, 72 F.3d at 330.   
                              III. 
                               A. 
         Lawrence alleges National Westminster Bank violated the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et 
seq., and New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), 
N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., by dismissing him because of his age. 
         Age discrimination claims under the ADEA and LAD are 
governed by the same standards and allocation of burdens of 
proof.  See Retter v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 755 F. Supp. 637, 638 
(D. N.J. 1991), aff'd, 975 F.2d 1551 (3d Cir. 1992); see alsoWaldron v. SL 
Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Lawrence's age discrimination claims are grounded not on 
direct evidence but on pretext.  We have adopted the McDonnell 
Douglas burden shifting analysis for age discrimination cases 
brought under a pretext theory.  See Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728; 
Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 897 (3d Cir.), 
cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).  Under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first present a prima facie 
case by establishing that (1) he is over 40 years old, (2) he is 
qualified for the position in question, (3) he suffered from an 
adverse employment decision, and (4) his replacement was 
sufficiently younger to permit a reasonable inference of age 
discrimination.  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728; Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 
897.  Once a plaintiff has satisfied the prime facie standard, 
the burden shifts to defendant to articulate a "legitimate 
nondiscriminatory" reason for the adverse employment decision.  
Should the defendant successfully carry its burden, the plaintiff 
then "has the opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's 
stated reasons were not its true reasons but were a pretext for 
discrimination."  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728.  At this stage, the 
plaintiff may defeat a summary judgment motion either: (1) by 
discrediting the proffered reasons for termination, directly or 
circumstantially, or (2) by adducing evidence that discrimination 
was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of 
the adverse action.  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731; see also Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) ("We hold that, to . . . 
[defeat a motion for summary judgment], the plaintiff generally 
must submit evidence which: l) casts sufficient doubt upon each 
of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a 
factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a 
fabrication; or 2) allows the factfinder to infer that 
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the adverse employment action"). 
         Here, the parties' disagreement revolves around the 
"pretext" prong of the discrimination claim.  The district court 
found Lawrence established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination, but determined "plaintiff failed to offer any 
evidence that suggests defendant's nondiscriminatory reason for 
terminating his employment is unworthy of belief."  The court 
then granted summary judgment in favor of National Westminster 
Bank.  
                               B. 
         After reviewing the record, we believe Lawrence cast 
sufficient doubt on National Westminster Bank's proffered reasons 
for his termination to create a material issue of fact.  SeeFuentes, 32 
F.3d at 762.  National Westminster Bank asserts it 
dismissed Lawrence because of poor job performance.  According to 
the bank, Lawrence's managerial and customer-relations skills 
declined dramatically in the year before his termination.  He 
lost customer accounts and the confidence of customers, 
supervisors and other bank employees.   
         In particular, National Westminster Bank argues 
Lawrence's last evaluation is demonstrative of his inadequate 
performance.  The evaluation rated his performance in several 
areas, falling into three categories: behavior; 
performance/financial standards; and specific objectives.  
Overall, he was described as meeting standards in the latter 
category, but falling below standards in the other two 
categories.  Lawrence challenges the credibility of the 
evaluation contending that the report was unsigned, undated, 
incomplete, and never provided to him during his employment. 
         National Westminster Bank also relies on a March 1993 
memorandum, prepared by Richard Moore, for National Westminster 
Bank's Senior Vice President, Peter Beisler, detailing several 
reasons why Lawrence was not "the right person to lead [National 
Westminster Bank's] investment effort in the future and should be 
replaced in that position."  National Westminster Bank contends 
Moore's memorandum substantiates its assertion Lawrence was fired 
"for cause." 
         A jury might well view Moore's memorandum as evidence 
that National Westminster Bank's proffered reasons for Lawrence's 
termination were not pretextual.  Lawrence, however, contends 
Moore prepared the memorandum as an after-the-fact justification 
for the discriminatory employment decision.  According to 
Lawrence, the memo was written at the direction of National 
Westminster Bank's human resources office once the termination 
decision was made.  Furthermore, Lawrence claims Moore did not 
actually believe he was incapable of performing at a satisfactory 
level.  At his deposition, Moore conceded he had no reason to 
believe Lawrence was incapable; rather, he thought Lawrence did 
not want to implement the kind of changes envisioned by Moore and 
the bank's new leadership.  A jury could find Lawrence's account 
credible.   
         To substantiate his account, Lawrence relies on 
depositions of his subordinates, which portray his performance in 
a favorable light.  According to Edward Hofmann, a Trust 
Portfolio Manager for the Trust Department, and Leonard Nedswick, 
an Administrative Officer in the Trust Department, Lawrence was 
competent and expressed an enthusiastic and positive attitude 
toward his work.  Hofmann described him as "a thorough investment 
professional, very interested in his business" and as "a very 
good portfolio manager."  Nedswick said he considered Lawrence 
qualified to service the accounts on which they worked together.  
Moreover, in contrast to National Westminster Bank's assertions, 
Nedswick stated he had never heard of an instance where Lawrence 
failed to inspire his co-workers, and based on his experience 
working with Lawrence, never believed him to be disinterested in 
customer contacts.  Both Hofmann and Nedswick stated they knew of 
no complaints about Lawrence's overall performance, and were 
unaware he was considered by upper management as the least 
favored portfolio manager.    
         We also differ with the district court over its 
observation that Lawrence's evaluations gradually grew less 
favorable over time.  Our review of Lawrence's performance 
evaluations contained in the record does not reveal on obvious 
downward trend.  Whether there was a trend, and what 
significance should be attached to a pattern of performance, 
should be determined by the fact finder.          
                               C. 
         In view of the foregoing, we believe the district court 
erred in ruling Lawrence failed to offer "any" evidence impugning 
National Westminster Bank's justification for his termination.  
"On summary judgment, it is not the court's role to weigh the 
disputed evidence and decide which is more probative."  Brewer, 
72 F.3d at 331.  As we explained in Sempier, the question is 
whether the record could support an inference the employer did 
not act for a non-discriminatory reason.  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 
732.  We believe such an inference could be supported by the 
record here.  We will reverse the grant of defendant's summary 
judgment motion on the age discrimination claims, and remand to 
the district court. 
 
                              IV. 
                               A. 
         Lawrence also alleges National Westminster Bank 
violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 
et seq., and New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, by 
discriminating against him on account of his back injury.  
Lawrence asserts both an improper termination claim as well as a 
failure to accommodate claim.  (Compl. at ¶ 26.) 
         The ADA proscribes "discrimination against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, 
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment."  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).  The term "qualified 
individual with a disability" means a person who, with or without 
"reasonable accommodation," can perform the essential functions 
of the employment position that person holds or seeks.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(8).  In addition, under the Act, an employer must make 
"reasonable accommodations" to the "known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability who is an applicant or employee."  42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(3).  New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination also 
prohibits unlawful discrimination because of a person's 
"handicap" in employment.  See N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1 and 10:5-29.1.   
 
                               B. 
         Turning to Lawrence's allegation that National 
Westminster Bank violated the ADA by firing him because of his 
disability, we rely on a pretextual analysis structurally similar 
to the one used for his age discrimination claim.  See McNemar v. 
Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 619 (3d Cir. 1996) (in ADA 
cases, courts apply the Title VII burden-shifting rules); Newman 
v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(explaining the methods and manner of proof applicable in other 
discrimination contexts, such as those involving Title VII and 
the ADEA, also apply in an action brought under the ADA).  
Unlike Lawrence's age discrimination claims, in this instance, 
the district court found Lawrence had failed to make out a prima 
facie case.  The court granted summary judgment against Lawrence 
because he had not introduced sufficient evidence to suggest a 
causal connection between his disability and his termination.   
         The district court erred when it required Lawrence to 
proffer evidence of a causal relationship to establish his prima 
facie case.  Under the McDonnell Douglas framework the elements 
necessary for a prima facie case may vary depending on the 
factual situation.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 n.13 (1973).  But to establish a prima facie case for 
discriminatory employment termination, the plaintiff must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he belongs to a 
protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he 
was dismissed despite being qualified; and (4) he was ultimately 
replaced by a person sufficiently outside the protected class to 
create an inference of discrimination.  See Sempier, 45 F.3d at 
728 (ADEA termination case); Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 897 (same).  
As with cases brought under Title VII and ADEA, it is permissible 
in an ADA case for a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent on 
the part of an employer through the McDonnell Douglas framework.  
 
                               C. 
                               1. 
         On remand, Lawrence must first establish the prima 
facie elements for disability discrimination under the proper 
standard.  Assuming Lawrence can satisfy his prima facie 
burden, then on pretext, his evidence supporting his age 
discrimination claims would also apply to his ADA disability 
claim.  Just as we found Lawrence presented sufficient evidence 
to support an inference he was not terminated for a reason 
unrelated to his age, we find he has advanced enough evidence to 
cast sufficient doubt upon defendant's claim he was fired for 
"cause" rather than on account of his physical condition.   
 
                              2.  
         Lawrence also challenges the district court's ruling 
barring his ADA claim for "failure to accommodate" because he 
never requested an accommodation.  Under the ADA, an employer is 
required to make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical 
limitations . . . of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability who is an . . . employee, unless such [employer] can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
on the operation of the business . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(5)(A).  Relying on the Interpretive Guide of Title I of 
the ADA, the court noted an employer is not expected to 
accommodate disabilities of which it is unaware.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
12111(9); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1996) ("In general . . . it is 
the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform 
the employer that an accommodation is needed.  When the need for 
an accommodation is not obvious, an employer, before providing a 
reasonable accommodation, may require that the individual with a 
disability provide documentation of the need for accommodation.") 
(EEOC regulations relating to "reasonable accommodation").  The 
court observed "plaintiff stated unequivocally . . . he never 
asked his employer for any type of accommodation" for his 
physical condition.  Lawrence contends an employer's knowledge of 
the disability is itself enough, and he cites to testimony 
indicating that National Westminster Bank employees were aware of 
his condition. 
         Whether or not a request by a plaintiff for 
accommodation is required to make an ADA claim is immaterial 
here, since Lawrence has not alleged or explained what actual 
accommodations were lacking.  We agree with the district court 
that Lawrence advanced no Rule 56 evidence depicting how National 
Westminster Bank failed to accommodate him as required by the 
Act.  Under Celotex, "the moving party is [entitled to summary 
judgment] because the nonmoving party has failed to make a 
sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with 
respect to which [he] has the burden of proof."  Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 323.  Moreover, all of the submitted Rule 56 evidence 
indicates that National Westminster Bank accommodated Lawrence 
whenever an accommodation was required.  Viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to Lawrence, we conclude the district 
court properly granted summary judgment against him regarding his 
ADA "accommodation" claim. 
 
                               D. 
         As for Lawrence's LAD claim, the district court 
acknowledged Lawrence's assertion his termination violated the 
Act insofar as it was motivated by his "handicap."  Yet, the 
court did not discuss this claim. 
         We have previously found that "in adjudicating cases 
brought under the ADA and NJLAD, courts apply the burden-shifting 
framework applicable to cases brought under Title VII . . . ." 
McNemar, 91 F.3d at 619; see Marzano v. Computer Science Corp. 
Inc., 91 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 1996).  Therefore, the ADA and 
LAD claims are governed by the same standards.  See, e.g., 
Ensslin v. Township of North Bergen, 646 A.2d 452, 458-59 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (noting New Jersey Supreme Court's 
suggestion of a correlation between state and federal law on 
handicap discrimination), certif. denied, 663 A.2d 1354 (N.J. 
1995); Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 805 (N.J. 
1988) (holding once a prima facie case under LAD has been 
established, the methodology employed by the United States 
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973), is followed); Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 446 A.2d 486 
n.3 (N.J. 1982). 
         In view of the district court's failure to address the 
LAD claim, and our prior assessment of the evidence related to 
the ADA termination claim, we will also reverse the grant of 
summary judgment regarding the LAD disability claim. 
                              V.A. 
         National Westminster Bank asked Lawrence to sign a 
termination agreement which would provide him with severance 
payments, in exchange for his promise not to take legal action 
against them.  With the advice of counsel, Lawrence refused to 
sign the agreement.  National Westminster Bank gave Lawrence no 
severance benefits after his termination.  
         Lawrence contends the denial of severance benefits 
following his refusal to sign the agreement constituted a breach 
of contract, as well as unlawful retaliation.  The district court 
dismissed Lawrence's claim because he "admitted" at deposition 
that he was owed no benefits by National Westminster Bank, and 
because employees terminated for cause are not entitled to 
severance benefits.  As we have indicated, the court also found 
Lawrence proffered no evidence contradicting National Westminster 
Bank's position that he was fired for "cause." 
                               B. 
         We agree with the district court that were Lawrence 
terminated for cause, he would not be entitled to receive 
severance benefits.  National Westminster Bank's employment 
manual contained a schedule setting out severance benefits based 
on an employee's age and tenure.  The manual was silent on 
whether termination for cause bars severance benefits.  Under New 
Jersey law, a company's employment manual may contractually bind 
the company.  Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 
1264 (N.J.), modified on other grounds, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); 
see also Witkowski v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 643 A.2d 546, 550 
(N.J. 1994) ("An employment manual providing terms and conditions 
of employment that include grounds and procedures for dismissal 
can create an employment contract.").  But Richard Moore, 
Executive Vice President of the Trust Department, testified that 
National Westminster Bank had a firm and uniform policy against 
granting severance benefits to employees dismissed for cause.  
Lawrence presented no evidence indicating National Westminster 
Bank had a policy entitling such employees to benefits.   
         In view of Moore's unrebutted testimony, we do not 
believe the employment manual alone creates a material dispute 
about whether terminated employees are owed severance benefits.  
We find the district court properly held that if Lawrence had 
been terminated for cause, he would not be entitled to severance 
benefits.    
         Of course, should a jury find Lawrence was not fired 
for cause, it could consider whether Lawrence was entitled to 
severance benefits upon his termination.  Under New Jersey law 
"[t]he key consideration in determining whether an employment 
manual gives rise to contractual obligations is the reasonable 
expectation of the employees."  Witkowski, 643 A.2d at 550.  As 
we have noted, National Westminster Bank's employment manual set 
out a schedule for severance benefits based on the employee's 
position and duration of employment.  In the past, severance 
benefits were paid to terminated employees but not to employees 
discharged for cause.  In the event it is determined Lawrence was 
not fired for cause, the jury should determine whether there was 
a reasonable expectation of receiving severance benefits.  SeeNicosia v. 
Wakefern Food Corp., 643 A.2d 554, 562 (N.J. 1994) 
("`disputes of fact as to the contract status of an employee 
under a manual are properly submitted to the jury'") (quoting 
lower court with approval).   
                               C. 
         Lawrence contends his denial of severance benefits 
following his refusal to sign the termination agreement amounted 
to "retaliation" and violated provisions of New Jersey statutory 
law.  New Jersey's Conscientious Employee Protection Act 
provides: 
         an employer cannot take any retaliatory 
         action against an employee because the 
         employee does any of the following: 
         discloses, or threatens to disclose . . .  
         the policy or practice of the employer . . . 
         that the employee reasonably believes is in 
         violation of a law, or a rule or regulation 
         promulgated pursuant to law. 
 
N.J.S.A. 34:19-1.  New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination makes 
it unlawful "[f]or any person to take reprisals against any 
person because he has opposed any practices or acts forbidden 
[under the Act] . . . or because he has filed a complaint, 
testified or assisted in any proceeding [under the Act].  
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).  To establish a prima facie case for 
retaliation under LAD a plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in a 
protected activity; (2) he was discharged subsequent to or 
contemporaneous with such activity; and (3) a causal link exists 
between the protected activity and the discharge.  Romano v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 665 A.2d 1139, 1142 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); cf. Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 
701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989) (setting out same elements for 
retaliation under federal law), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 
(1990).  Lawrence contends he has established a prima facie case, 
and that National Westminster Bank has failed to offer a non- 
retaliatory reason for the adverse action.  See Romano, 665 A.2d 
at 1142 (once plaintiff establishes prima facie elements of 
retaliation, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non- 
retaliatory reason for the decision).  National Westminster Bank 
argues Lawrence has not set out a prima facie case of 
retaliation.  It contends Lawrence's deposition responses show 
there was no causal link between his refusal to sign the 
agreement and his subsequent termination and denial of benefits. 
         The district court dismissed the counts of the 
complaint alleging National Westminster Bank denied Lawrence 
benefits in retaliation for his refusal to sign what he believed 
to be an illegal termination agreement.  Again, the court found 
the record devoid of any evidence to support such an allegation, 
or that Lawrence was terminated for any reason other than his 
performance.  While we differ with the district court whether 
there were disputed material facts related to the discrimination 
and contract claims, we agree with the court there was 
insufficient evidence of causation.  
         Lawrence's retaliation theory derives from his refusal 
of the bank's offer of a severance package conditioned on his 
accession to the terms of the termination agreement.  Yet these 
actions alone do not create a genuine issue of material fact.  
National Westminster Bank believed it had no duty to grant 
severance benefits.  All the record evidence demonstrates that 
National Westminster Bank never offered severance benefits to 
employees terminated for cause.  That it offered Lawrence 
benefits as inducement to sign the termination agreement does not 
suggest the failure to tender benefits absent Lawrence's assent 
was retaliatory.  Lawrence offers no evidence for his contention 
he was denied benefits because of his refusal to sign the 
termination agreement.  Therefore, we will affirm that part of 
the district court's summary judgment order dismissing Lawrence's 
retaliation claim. 
                              VI. 
                               A. 
         Lawrence also asserts National Westminster Bank's 
request that he sign a purportedly illegal termination agreement 
constituted a violation of the Older Workers Benefit Protection 
Act ("OWBPA"), a part of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.  The 
OWBPA makes it unlawful to "discharge . . . or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual" with respect to employment 
terms or conditions "because of such individual's age."  29 U.S.C 
§ 623(1).  In relevant part, OWBPA amended the ADEA, 
"specifically limiting the manner in which an employee may waive 
the protections afforded under [the ADEA]."  Oberg v. Allied Van 
Lines, Inc., 11 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, __ 
U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2104, 128 L.Ed.2d 665 (1994); see 29 U.S.C. § 
626(f); see generally John R. Runyun, Hedging Betts: The Older 
Workers Benefit Protection Act, 72 Mich. B. J. 168 (1993) 
(explaining the features of OWBPA). 
         The district court rejected Lawrence's OWBPA claim, and 
granted National Westminster Bank's motion for summary judgment.  
Because Lawrence never signed the agreement, the district court 
found he suffered no injury under OWBPA.  The court also 
reiterated its view that Lawrence was terminated for cause, and 
concluded this was the reason he was denied severance benefits.  
Moreover, the court stated it did not believe a violation of 
OWBPA alone could serve as the basis for an age discrimination 
claim under the ADEA, or that Congress created a private right of 
action for violations of the OWBPA.  In the court's view, the 
only effect of an illegal agreement is that National Westminster 
Bank cannot rely on it. 
              Lawrence maintains the court improperly analyzed 
his OWBPA claim.  In particular, he asserts the court erred in 
concluding he lacked standing because he did not sign the 
agreement, and in determining the Act does not provide for a 
private right of action.    
                               B. 
         We concur with the district court that Lawrence's OWBPA 
claim is unfounded.  As the court noted, Lawrence never signed 
the termination agreement presented to him; therefore, he never 
"waived" his rights under the Act and cannot establish a 
violation of § 626(f).  The alleged effort to induce him to sign 
the agreement could not result in a violation of OWBPA's waiver 
provisions. 
         Because Lawrence suffered no injury cognizable under 
the OWBPA, we need not decide whether the waiver provisions of 
OWBPA may be enforced through private civil actions. 
                              VII. 
         Finally, Lawrence argues the statutory violations he 
alleged were also violations of New Jersey public policy.  We 
hold the district court correctly dismissed Lawrence's public 
policy claim.   
         Under New Jersey law "an employee has a cause of action 
for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear 
mandate of public policy."  See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980).  "The sources of public 
policy include legislation; administrative rule, regulations or 
decisions; and judicial decisions."  Id.  Because the sources of 
public policy Lawrence relies on are coterminous with his 
statutory claims, he cannot advance a separate common law public 
policy claim.  See Catalane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 638 A.2d 
1341, 1349 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (ruling common law claim 
of violation of public policy should not be submitted to jury 
where statutory remedy under LAD exists), certif. denied, 642 
A.2d 1006 (N.J. 1994); cf. Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 561 A.2d 
1130, 1141 (N.J. 1989) ("Because the LAD provides . . . a remedy, 
it might be unnecessary to recognize or create a Pierce-type 
action to vindicate substantially the same rights and provide 
similar relief."). 
         Moreover, the paradigmatic dismissal giving rise to a 
public policy cause of action is the termination of an employee 
in retaliation for the employee's refusal to act contrary to 
public policy.  See Citizens State Bank, New Jersey v. 
Libertelli, 521 A.2d 867, 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) 
(explaining Pierce protects an employee from retaliation for 
refusal to commit an act violating a clear mandate of public 
policy).  As noted, we agree with the district court that 
Lawrence has advanced no evidence of retaliation. 
         We will affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment against Lawrence on his public policy claim.  
                             VIII. 
         For the foregoing reasons we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part the judgment of the district court.  We will 
remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
